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Scotland	and	Wales	wait	for	the	Supreme	Court
referee	on	Brexit
As	the	UK	government	refers	the	Scottish	and	Welsh	bills	to	alter	inherited	EU	law	to	the	Supreme
Court,	Richard	Parry	(University	of	Edinburgh)	discusses	the	interacting	policies	on	devolution
and	Brexit.
As	part	of	their	unfolding	tactics	on	Brexit,	the	Scottish	and	Welsh	governments	have	through	their
legislators	taken	powers	to	alter	inherited	EU-based	law	in	devolved	areas	after	Brexit	date	(the
UK	Withdrawal	from	the	European	Union	(Legal	Continuity)	(Scotland)	Bill	and	Law	Derived	from
the	European	Union	(Wales)	Bill).	The	UK	government	response	on	17	April	has	been	to	refer	the	bills	to	the
Supreme	Court	as	outside	the	legislators’	powers	to	pass.	What	should	be	a	natural	part	of	the	system,	when	the
levels	disagree	on	their	respective	powers,	is	sufficiently	unprecedented	to	be	of	striking	political	effect,	especially
now	that	Scotland	and	Wales	with	their	different	political	makeup	are	united	behind	the	same	approach.
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The	passage	of	the	Scottish	bill	was	preceded	by	a	dramatic	moment,	overshadowed	by	the	extreme	weather,	when
the	Presiding	Officer	of	the	Scottish	Parliament,	Ken	Macintosh,	declared	that	in	his	opinion	the	new	law	was	outwith
the	powers	of	the	Parliament.	He	is	required	to	address	this	issue	in	the	case	of	every	bill	that	it	is	introduced,	but	it	is
a	curious	power.	It	does	not	prevent	the	introduction	or	passage	of	the	bill	and	is	not	legally	binding.	The	competence
of	a	bill	can	only	be	determined	by	the	UK	Supreme	Court	after	referral	by	Scottish	or	British	laws	officers	once	it	is
passed.	The	Presiding	Officer	power	seems	designed	to	warn	off	obvious	attempts,	especially	by	individual
members,	to	pursue	legislation	in	clearly	reserved	areas.
Macintosh’s	decision	reveals	a	line	of	legal	advice	that	contrasts	with	the	Lord	Advocate’s	(as	set	out	to	the
Parliament	on	28	February).	International	affairs,	including	EU	law	and	institutions,	are	clearly	reserved,	but	the
grounds	of	the	Presiding	Officer’s	objection	are	not	that.	Instead	he	suggests	that	the	new	law	is	invalid	as	it	foresees
a	situation	(Brexit)	that	has	not	yet	happened.	The	Lord	Advocate	agrees	that	the	use	of	the	Act	to	amend	laws
would	not	be	valid	pre-Brexit,	but	points	out	that	this	objection	would	apply	to	the	UK	Government’s	withdrawal	bill	as
well.
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At	the	same	time	the	Welsh	Presiding	Officer	issued	her	certification	of	the	Welsh	bill	in	the	usual	routine	way,
without	explanation.	She	is	Elin	Jones,	Rural	Affairs	Minister	when	Plaid	Cymru	were	in	coalition	with	Labour.	Just	as
Macintosh	has	abandoned	his	party	allegiance	(Labour),	so	has	she.	But	unlike	him	she	has	not	attempted	to	deploy
a	base	of	legal	advice	to	rival	the	government’s.	This	may	reflect	the	Welsh	Assembly’s	genesis	in	1999	as	a	single
corporate	body	with	subsequent	separation	into	legislative	and	executive	branches.	The	texts	of	the	bills	are	different
and	reflect	different	legislative	frameworks.	It	could	be	argued	that	this	accounts	for	the	discrepant	opinions.		But	the
heart	of	the	matter	–	taking	powers	now	in	anticipation	of	UK	withdrawal	–	is	surely	the	same.
In	both	Scotland	and	Wales,	the	situation	has	arisen	because	the	UK	government	wants	to	gain	legislative	consent
for	its	withdrawal	bill	through	a	political	deal	with	the	devolved	governments	that	demarcates	any	former	EU-derived
powers	that	might	be	retained	by	Westminster	in	the	name	of	maintaining	a	common	UK	market.	If	this	cannot	be
negotiated	the	UK	can	have	its	way	by	taking	the	powers	it	wants	by	primary	legislation,	which	no-one	doubts	its
legal	ability	to	do.	Its	pursuit	of	a	negotiated	agreement	reflects	not	just	a	desire	for	agreement	but	also	political
weakness	and	lack	of	secure	parliamentary	majority.
Meanwhile,	the	process	continues	of	what	might	be	seen	the	UK’s	expulsion	from	the	EU	–	in	the	sense	that	the
EU27	are	thinking	beyond	withdrawal	and	seem	intent	on	closing	off	any	UK	second	thoughts.	The	draft	Withdrawal
Agreement	of	19	March	and	EU	negotiating	guidelines	of	23	March	are	quite	brutal	in	taking	control	of	the	process.
The	UK’s	membership	ends	on	29	March	2019	but	its	financial	and	legal	effect	is	perpetuated	until	30	December
2020	with	only	the	most	minimal	consultation.	The	UK’s	expressed	red	lines	–	whether	or	not	fully	meant	–	are
construed	to	rule	out	anything	beyond	a	free	trade	agreement	with	which	EU	members	are	comfortable.	There	is	no
mechanism	for	extending	what	is	now	billed,	in	a	laughable	‘concession’	to	the	UK’s	preferred	term,	the	‘transition	or
implementation	period’	(art	121).	At	the	moment	there	is	nothing	to	be	implemented	beyond	March	2019.	The
‘Protocol	on	Ireland/Northern	Ireland’	gives	legal	form	to	the	concept	of	‘the	United	Kingdom	in	respect	of	Northern
Ireland’	which	‘shall	be	considered	to	be	part	of	the	customs	territory	of	the	Union’	unless	both	EU	(with	an	implicit
Irish	veto)	and	UK	agree	something	else.
Remarkably,	the	UK	government	has	managed	to	portray	all	this	as	a	negotiating	success.	Their	most	concrete
achievement	is	winning	the	right	to	sign	as	well	as	negotiate	international	agreements	in	areas	of	EU	competence
after	March	2019	as	long	as	they	do	not	come	into	effect	before	2021.	Tough	negotiating	to	get	a	good	deal,	the
rejected	political	premise	of	Theresa	May’s	2017	election	campaign,	always	implied	refusal	to	leave	the	EU	unless
the	terms	were	right.	Now	that	leaving	has	become	an	end	in	itself,	anything	that	might	hold	it	up	is	liable	to	be
jettisoned,	including	perhaps	resistance	to	the	united	front	of	the	Scottish	and	Welsh	governments.	The	likelihood	is
that	the	UK	law	officers’	action	will	simply	be	a	ploy	in	negotiations.	The	Attorney-General’s	statement	of	17	April
suggests	as	much.	After	the	Miller	case	of	2017,	the	UK	level	will	surely	be	wary	of	assuming	that	the	Supreme	Court
will	share	their	perspective.	The	Welsh,	but	not	the	Scottish,	referee	waved	play	on	but	Ken	Macintosh’s	‘on-field
decision’	was	cited	by	the	UK’s	Advocate-General	for	Scotland,	Lord	Keen,	as	a	reason	for	the	referral	in	order	to
remove	legal	uncertainty.	It	is	a	dangerous	argument	to	make,	for	what	would	the	UK	position	be	if		Macintosh,	like
Jones,	had	gone	the	other	way?
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at	the
Centre	on	Constitutional	Change	blog.
Richard	Parry	is	Honorary	Fellow	in	Social	Policy	at	the	University	of	Edinburgh.
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